Security: SSRF risk in OpenID discovery fetch#3690
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tuanaiseo wants to merge 1 commit intoKinto:mainfrom
Open
Security: SSRF risk in OpenID discovery fetch#3690tuanaiseo wants to merge 1 commit intoKinto:mainfrom
tuanaiseo wants to merge 1 commit intoKinto:mainfrom
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`fetch_openid_config()` performs `requests.get()` on a URL derived from untrusted `issuer` input without host allowlisting, scheme enforcement, or private-address blocking. An attacker could force server-side requests to internal services/metadata endpoints (SSRF). Affected files: utils.py Signed-off-by: tuanaiseo <221258316+tuanaiseo@users.noreply.github.com>
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This seems useful! thank you :) Could you please add the appropriate tests to reach full coverage? |
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Problem
fetch_openid_config()performsrequests.get()on a URL derived from untrustedissuerinput without host allowlisting, scheme enforcement, or private-address blocking. An attacker could force server-side requests to internal services/metadata endpoints (SSRF).Severity:
highFile:
kinto/plugins/openid/utils.pySolution
Validate and normalize issuer values against a strict allowlist, enforce
httpsonly, reject localhost/link-local/private IP ranges after DNS resolution, and consider using a hardened HTTP client policy for outbound identity-provider calls.Changes
kinto/plugins/openid/utils.py(modified)Testing